


Orientation for a fast-changing energy world

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Tokyo, 21 April 2014


- **Some long-held tenets of the energy sector are being rewritten**
 - *Countries are switching roles: importers are becoming exporters...*
 - *... and exporters are among the major sources of growing demand*
 - *New supply options re-orientate the energy trade map*
- **But long-term solutions to global challenges remain scarce**
 - *Renewed focus on energy efficiency, but CO₂ emissions continue to rise*
 - *Fossil-fuel subsidies increased to \$544 billion in 2012*
 - *1.3 billion people lack electricity – especially in Africa and S.Asia*
- **Energy prices add to the pressure on policymakers**
 - *Sustained period of high oil prices without parallel in market history*
 - *Large, persistent regional price differences for gas & electricity*

The engine of energy demand growth moves to South Asia

Primary energy demand, 2035 (Mtoe)




Share of global growth 2012-2035



China is the main driver of increasing energy demand in the current decade, but India takes over in the 2020s as the principal source of growth

A mix that is slow to change


Growth in total primary energy demand



Today's share of fossil fuels in the global mix, at 82%, is the same as it was 25 years ago; the strong rise of renewables only reduces this to around 75% in 2035

Unconventional oil and gas has made a major contribution to global production


US shale gas and shale oil production increases: 2005-2014



Growth in US shale gas output since 2005 is equivalent to the total production of Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Iraq combined; while shale oil output is equal to that of Iraq

US oil imports are shrinking rapidly – thanks to shale oil only?


Reductions in US oil imports in 2035 relative to today



US oil imports are set to plummet due to increasing oil supplies and recently adopted policies to improve efficiency of cars and trucks

Two chapters to the oil production story


Contributions to global oil production growth



The United States (light tight oil) & Brazil (deepwater) step up until the mid-2020s, but the Middle East is critical to the longer-term oil outlook

US emissions on a downward trend


Energy-related CO₂ emissions in the United States



CO₂ emissions fell sharply since the shale gas revolution, but rebounded last year on the back of a partial gas-coal switch and increased industrial activity

Who has flooded the markets?


Incremental steam coal exports



The US accounted for only 7% of the increase in global steam coal exports since 2007

The slowdown in Chinese demand caught the industry off-guard


Coal demand in China: real demand vs historical trend



China's move away from coal will be a far greater determinant of the direction of the coal markets than the shale gas revolution in the US

Who has the energy to compete?


Ratio of industrial energy prices relative to the United States



Regional differences in natural gas prices narrow from today's very high levels but remain large through to 2035; electricity price differentials also persist

Higher energy prices make it harder for Japanese industry to compete


Share of global export market for energy-intensive goods to 2035



Even in our Central Scenario (in which nuclear reactors gradually restart), higher energy prices result in a decline in Japan's share of global trade in energy-intensive goods

LNG from the United States can alleviate strain on the gas markets, but is no silver bullet

Indicative economics of LNG export from the US Gulf Coast




New LNG supplies accelerate movement towards a more interconnected global market, but high costs of transport between regions mean no single global gas price

The implications of Zero Nuclear for Japan's energy outlook to 2035

- Energy import bills – the key to the record current account deficit – rise by an additional 1.3 Trillion Yen per year on average
- To replace the nuclear capacity, investment in the power sector & in LNG terminals needs to rise by an additional 250 Billion Yen per year
- Japan's energy self-sufficiency deteriorates
 - *Self-sufficiency drops by one-third to just 16% in 2035, which is 5 times lower than China's & 6 times lower than that of the US*
- Effects on LNG market in Asia: low (or zero) nuclear power generation in Japan will contribute to a tightening of Asian LNG markets, leading to upward pressure on gas prices in Asia

Climate implications of Zero Nuclear

Japan's CO₂ emissions in power generation



With Zero Nuclear, expectations for declining CO₂ emissions from the power sector are reversed, with emissions in 2035 higher than before Fukushima Daiichi

Orientation for a fast-changing energy world: Implications for Japan

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- **Regional price gaps & concerns over competitiveness are here to stay, but there are ways to react – with efficiency first in line**
- **Gas market reforms in the Asia-Pacific region and LNG exports from N. America could help to narrow the regional gas price gap**
- **Nuclear power and renewables can contribute to energy security, climate change goals & enhancing energy competitiveness**
- **Support schemes for renewables need to be carefully designed – & re-designed – to achieve their objectives in the most cost-effective way**
- **The new Basic Energy Plan sends a strong message about Japan's focus on delivering reliable, secure, affordable and clean energy**